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AUTOS, TITLE CERTIFICATES AND UCC 9-103:
THE DRAFTSMEN TRY AGAIN
By
RALPH J. ROHNER*
Washington, D. C.
The publication in April 1971 of the Final Report1 of the Review
Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has un-
closeted many of the skeletons in the Secured Transactions portion
of the Code. One of them-the subject of this paper-is the constant
problem of recognition of foreign security interests on motor vehicles
covered by certificates of title. The key Code section, 9-103(4), has
been criticized by courts and commentators as an example of "obtuse-
ness, internal ambiguity and lack of specificity," 2 and "blunderous
draftsmanship."' 3 It is completely rewritten in the Final Report, and the
pertinent revised portion of 9-103 reads as follows:
(2) Certificate of title.
"(a) This subsection applies to goods covered by a certificate
of title issued under a statute of this state or of another jurisdic-
tion which requires indication of a security interest on the certifi-
cate as a condition of perfection.
"(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, perfec-
tion and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of the security
interest are governed by the law (including the conflict of laws
rules) of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate until four months
after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter
until the goods are registered in another jurisdiction, but in any
event not beyond surrender of the certificate. After the expiration
of that period, the goods are not covered by the certificate of title
within the meaning of this section.
"(c) Except with respect to the rights of a buyer described in
the next paragraph, a security interest, perfected in another juris-
diction otherwise than by notation on a certification [sic] of title,
in goods brought into this state and thereafter covered by a cer-
tificate of title issued by this state is subject to the rules stated
in paragraph (d) of subsection (1).
*Associate Professor of Law at the Catholic University of America.
1. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, RE-
VIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9, FINAL REPORT (1971) (hereinafter called
FINAL REPORT). An analysis of the entire report may be found in Funk, The
Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Part 1), 26
THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1465 (1971); (Part 2), 27 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 321
(1971).
2. Seely v. 1st Bank & Trust, 315 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 559,
564 (1970).
3. 3 BENDER'S UCC REP.-DIGEST, at 2-1584 (1971).
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"(d) If goods are brought into this state while a security in-
terest therein is perfected in any manner under the law of thejurisdiction from which the goods are removed and a certificate
of title is issued by this state and the certificate does not show that
the goods are subject to the security interest or that they may be
subject to security interests not shown on the certificate, the se-
curity interest is subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods
who is not in the business of selling goods of that kind to the ex-
tent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after
issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security
interest."
In the meantime, while the Review Committee labored, the courts
could not ignore disputes involving out-of-state security interests in
titled motor vehicles. The accumulation of case law as well as the pres-
ent language of 9-103(4) require some attention in order fairly to
assess the worth of the proposed new version.
Statutory Background
The Code draftsmen have never been quite sure of their ground
in dealing with foreign security interests, and this uneasiness is most
apparent in their treatment of motor vehicles. There was a pre-Code
conflict of laws maxim to the effect that the lex situs-the law of the
place where the property was when the security interest attached-
governed its effectiveness despite removal of the property to another
state, unless the creditor consented to the removal.4 But as early as
1948, a commentator 5 could review the automobile cases of the prior
year and find that four of the six of them protected the local purchaser
rather than the foreign lienor, on grounds hardly reconcilable with
each other, much less with the prevailing maxim.
Certificate of title acts had been enacted in many states and in many
of them liens were required to be noted on the certificate as a condi-
tion of validity. The Code draftsmen considered the possibility of in-
cluding certificate-of-title provisions in the original Code, but backed
off in favor of an effort by the Conference of Motor Vehicle Commis-
sioners." Instead, the Code deferred its own filing scheme to existing
certificate of title laws and upgraded "incomplete" title acts to "com-
plete" or "exclusive" ones where notation of the security interest on
the certificate would be the only method of perfection.7
With respect to the conflict-of-law problems, the Code sought a mid-
dle ground between total protection of either the foreign creditor or
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 265-78 (1934).
5. Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA.
L. REV. 455 (1948).
6. Cf. Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code,
16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 31 n. 21 (1951).
7. UCC 9-302(3)(b); UCC 9-302(4).
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the local purchaser. Security interests in "equipment" motor vehicles
were to be recognized if perfected where the debtor had his chief place
of business, under 9-103(2). Otherwise, under 9-103(3), a foreign
perfected interest "continues perfected in this state for four months
and also thereafter if within the four month period it is perfected in this
state." 9-103(4) was not in the original Code. This addition arose in
the context of the New York Law Revision Commission study of the
Code" and appeared in the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code and as part of the official text
in 1957. It provides:
"(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal
property is covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute
of this state or any other jurisdiction which requires indication on
a certificate of title of any security interest in the property as a
condition of perfection, then the perfection is governed by the
law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate."
Meanwhile, in 1952 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws took up the project of writing a uniform title act;
in 1955 the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft
Act was approved by the Commissioners and by the ABA with the
express purpose "to facilitate vehicle sales and sales financing by
simplifying procedures for transfers and the creation and perfection of
liens." 9 The Act, however, has gained only grudging acceptance in the
states, 10 and a recent study" of certificate of title legislation reveals
tremendous non-uniformity in the title acts currently in force.
The Article 9 Review Committee has worked since 1967, and has
published two Preliminary Drafts12 both of which are wholly super-
seded by the Final Report. In general comments appended to their
Report, the Committee explains its redrafting of 9-103:
8. This origin has been traced in part through unpublished correspondence
between the NYLRC and the NCCUSL Article 9 Subcommittee. See, Comment,
Perfection of Security Interests in Multi-State Transactions When Property is
Covered By A Certificate of Title, 47 B. U. L. REV. 430, 434 n. 18 (1967).
9. Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act, 9B UNI-
FORM LAWS ANNOTATED 369 (1966) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note).
10. Through the 1971 legislative sessions the Act had been adopted substan-
tially intact in 6 states: Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, and Vermont. See, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-165-14-211 (Supp.
1969); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 68-401-68-403 (1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
754 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 162, §§174.01-174.31 (Supp. 1971);
N. H. STAT. ANN. §§ 269-A: 1-49 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, ch. 21, §§ 2001-
2087 (Supp. 1970).
11. Ward, Interstate Perfection oj the Motor Vehicle Security Interest: A
Bottleneck in Section 9-103, 34 ALB. L. REV. 251 (1969).
12. First Report of the Review Committee for Article 9: Preliminary Draft
No. 1, 24 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 341 (1969); Preliminary Report No. 2 of the
Review Committee on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 THE
BUSINESS LAWYER 1067 (1970).
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"Section 9-103 was drafted [originally] in the light of the un-
certainty whether the Code would be widely adopted, and the
emphasis was on conflicting rules of law and a desire to make
the Code rules applicable where such a result was justified under
general principles. Today, when 51 jurisdictions have adopted
the Code, situations of actual conflict in rules of law within the
ambit of the Code will be few, and the emphasis may shift to
the question of certainty as to where to file in order to perfect
security interests.' 13
Whether this quest for certainty can succeed remains to be seen.
Commercial Context
As of October 1971 there was more than $37 billion of automobile
paper outstanding in the hands of commercial banks, finance companies
and other lenders; 14 close to $3 billion worth of new automobile in-
stallment credit is extended each month.1 5 Over 8 million cars were
sold at retail in 1970,16 and fully two-thirds of them are sold on an
installment credit basis. 1 7 Countless numbers of these vehicles are
removed each year from one state to another on a permanent basis,
and whether the mover be a skip-state buyer, a thief, a serviceman
changing duty stations, or simply an average man changing his job
and residence, 'the sheer mobility of the automobile creates for the
creditor the problem of protecting himself against third parties in the
second state.
Among those third parties who can become claimants to the vehicle,
used car dealers and sub-purchasers are perhaps the most common-
they are the often-unwitting fences for crooks bent on unloading hot
cars. Lending institutions in the second state may take new security
interests in the car. Judgment creditors of the original purchasers (or
of any sub-purchaser) may attempt to levy on it. And more and more,
with the spiralling rate of consumer bankruptcies, the third-party
claimant is a trustee in bankruptcy.
As noted, the pre-Code cases paid lip service to the Restatement
maxim that the original creditor remained protected unless he con-
sented to removal, but that rule was called a "verbal strait jacket" in
a study 8 which identified at least 10 distinct grounds on which courts
at times refused to enforce foreign liens. In certificate of title cases
also, recognition of the foreign lien was considered to be the majority
13. FINAL REPORT, at 229-30.
14. FED. RES. BULL. (Dec. 1971), at A 56.
15. Id. at A 58.
16. AUTO. MFRS. ASS'N, 1971 AUTOMOBILE FACTS & FIGURES 17 (1971).
17. Id. at 44.
18. Comment, The California Used Car Dealer and the Foreign Lien-A
Study in the Conflict of Laws, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 555 (1959).
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rule.19 But again cases holding for the local purchaser arose 20 and prob-
ably reached their peak in Ohio in 1964 in Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Pottmeyer21 where the court acknowledged that a clean Ohio cer-
tificate bestowed a kind of negotiability on automobiles.
The policy question can be simply posed: whether it is fairer and
more in accord with commercial reality to give extended protection
to a secured creditor whose collateral is taken out of the state, or to
give an expanded kind of bonafide purchaser status to persons who deal
with the vehicle after it has been removed. The sub-considerations,
though, are numerous and at times conflicting. Enhancement of foreign
certificates necessarily undercuts the reliability of local ones. Preven-
tive techniques are available to both the creditor and to the purchaser,
but not always in equal measure-a finance company may utilize the
services of investigative agencies to trace vehicles, 2 2 but a consumer
buying a used car can hardly be expected to question the reliability of
a title certificate issued by his own motor vehicle registrar.
Opportunities and risks vary. Banks extending automobile credit
only to low-risk customers are often simply unconcerned about reper-
fection in other states or are content to rely on non-filing insurance.
Creditors, though, do have readily available handbooks23 advising pre-
cisely what steps are necessary to repeffect anywhere in the country.
Many automobile financers operate nationwide and are therefore not
forced to trace or investigate at a distance. Used car dealers may be
expected to investigate the origins of vehicles they purchase, but should
a trustee as representative of general creditors of a purchaser or owner
be allocated substantial investigatory duties and risks?
In short, both the traditional rule, and the rule of UCC 9-103(4),
have been criticized generally as being inconsistent with the notions of
bona fide purchaser protection in other parts of the Code, 24 but at the
moment subsection (4) as interpreted remains basically creditor-
oriented.
The Code Provisions in Action
Even without reference to the cases, there are at least these prob-
lems with 9-103 (4):
19. Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 47
IOWA L. REV. 346, 358-60 (1961).
20. See, i.e., 1st Nat'l Bank of Jamestown v. Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super.
265, 54 A.2d 61 (1947); Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 159 Fla. 481, 32 So. 2d 7
(1947).
21. 176 Ohio St. 1, 197 N.E. 2d 343 (1964).
22. The work of such an agency is described in Pascack Valley B. & T. Co.
v. Ritar Ford, Inc., 6 Conn. Cir., 489, 276 A.2d 800 (1970).
23. The "Annual Directory" published by National Finance Adjusters of
Detroit is an example.
24. Vernon, supra note 19, at 363; Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Ve-
hicles Subject to Security Interests: A Case For Repealing UCC § 9-103(4),
54 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1969); Comment, supra note 8, at 438-39.
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1. The subsection applies "Notwithstanding subsections (2) and
(3). . . ." By its terms it displaces entirely the other rules in 9-103,
including the rules for commercial ("equipment") vehicles in 9-103
(2), the four-month grace period in subsection (3), and the limita-
tion on the secured creditor's protection when he knows of the re-
moval within 30 days after attachment. To apply the section literally
has been challenged as inconsistent with the rest of 9-103 and as giv-
ing the secured creditor greater protection than necessary. 25
2. Subsection (4) applies only where the certificate is issued under
a statute "which requires indication on a certificate of title of any se-
curity interest in the property as a condition of perfection, . . ." It may
be arguable whether a particular statute "requires" indication on a
certificate; the apparent reference is to "complete" title acts, but one
study26 has shown that the great variety among title acts make this
reference uncertain. For example, the Connecticut statute27 provides
that a security interest is perfected by delivery to the commissioner
of any outstanding certificate, plus an application and the required fee:
there is no explicit requirement that the security interest be actually
noted on the certificate as a condition of perfection. At least twenty
states have such provisions, 2 but thus far there has been no litigation
on the precise point.
3. There are two possible time references in subsection (4), neither
of which is clearly compelled. The vehicle must be covered by a cer-
tificate, but when? At the time of entry into the state or at the time
some third-party claim arises? The section simply is unclear, and
neither the comments 29 nor the Editorial Board's 1956 "Reason for
Change" 0 shed any light. If the time of entry is meant, then subsec-
tion (3) applies whenever a non-titled car comes into the state.
4. It is unclear from the language of 9-103(4) when a vehicle is
"covered" by a certificate. What happens when application is made
for a certificate of title, but the car is removed to another state before
the title is officially issued? What if a state with no significant contacts
with the transaction issues a certificate noting the lien? Should that
25. Note, supra note 24.
26. Ward, supra note 11, at 253 passim. See also, Note, Section 9-103 and
the Interstate Movement of Goods, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 72, 90 (1967).
27. Conn. Gen. Stat. §14-185 (Supp. 1969).
28. Seventeen states are identified by Ward, supra note 11, at 259-60. Three
additional states-Massachusetts, Minnesota and Vermont-have adopted the
same provision since 1969. See, note 10, supra.
29. Comment 3 to 9-103 says: "Where property is covered by a certificate of
title, the governing rule is stated in subsection (4) of this section." Comment
7 redundantly says the same thing.
30. 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 257:
"Subsection (4) is new to avoid the possible necessity of duplicating
perfection the the case of vehicles subject to a certificate of title law
requiring compliance therewith to perfect security interests. The certificate
of title law requirements are adopted as the test for perfection."
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certificate be recognized? Even worse, what if two certificates are out-
standing at the same time? Professor Gilmore3 l concedes that 9-103 (4)
presently says nothing about the multiple-certificate situation, and
several cases have had to struggle with the problem on their own.
5. Beyond statutory construction of subsection (4), it is impossible
to discern with any confidence the intent of its draftsmen. Section
9-302(3) of the Code encourages the retention of certificate of title
laws, and supports the view that notation of liens on certificates which
can move with the vehicle and which must be surrendered upon sale
or reregistration of it, is the preferable method of preventing secret
liens and of protecting the legitimate interests of the creditor. The spe-
cific reason given for adding 9-103 (4) is "to avoid the possible neces-
sity of duplicating perfection . . . ." Duplication either by filing or by
notation on a certificate would only be necessary if some original
perfection were about to expire. Arguably, then, the draftsmen were
concerned about the four-month grace period in 9-103(3) (which
would apply in the absence of subsection (4)), and preferred to give
the creditor unlimited protection if he noted his interest on a title cer-
tificate. This view reinforces the conclusion that the vehicle must be
covered by the certificate at the time of entry, but it gives no effect
to the alternative phrase "under a statute of this state," for if the in-
terest were in fact noted on a local certificate there would be no need
for "duplication of perfection."
Alternatively, the draftsmen were concerned that certificates of title
might not be given extra-territorial effect 32 and wrote subsection (4)
to assure that foreign certificates would be recognized and also to en-
courage out-of-state lenders to apply for local certificates if it were
contemplated the vehicle would be brought into the enacting state. If
this is so, the section is still unclear whether blanket protection is in-
tended, or whether the four-month grace period or the knowledge-of-
removal limitations from 9-103(3) should be carried over.
A. The Stamper Problem
Perhaps the most notorious controversy under 9-103(4) concerns
vehicles brought from non-title to title states where clean certificates
are issued before disposition of the vehicles to innocent purchasers.
Does subsection (4) apply to the exclusion of subsection (3), thereby
protecting the purchaser under the clean certificate? Or is it implied
in subsection (4) that the title certificate controls perfection only if
the certificate had been issued at the time the vehicle was imported?
The cases conflict. In GMAC v. Mannheim Motor Auction,33 a
31. 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 623 (1965).
32. A student note saw this possibility and argued against it: Note, Security
Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the UCC: A New Chassis for Certificate of
Title Legislation, 70 YALE L. J. 995, 1021 (1961).
33. 57 LANC. L. REV. 457, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 179, 1 UCC REP. SERV. 388
(1961).
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Pennsylvania County Court in an alternate holding ruled that subsec-
tion (4) cut off the rights of the out-of-state creditor whose interest
was not noted on the Pennsylvania certificate at the time third-parties
acquired rights in the vehicle. This holding has been held contrary to
and overruled 34 by the subsequent Pennsylvania opinion in Casterline
v. GMAC,3 5 but closer scrutiny indicates the cases are distinguishable:
Casterline concerned events occurring in 1957, more than two years
before the enactment of 9-103(4) in Pennsylvania;' it was therefore
controlled by the more general rule of subsection (3), while the dispute
in Mannheim was subject to the special certificate of title rule in sub-
section (4).
Within a year, though, the New York Appellate Division36 cited
Casterline for the proposition that 9-103(4) had no application to an
automobile sold and encumbered in a non-title state and then removed
to a state which required notation of liens on title certificates. The court
thereby read into subsection (4) a -time reference-i.e., the subsection
applied only when the vehicle was covered by a certificate at the time
of entry. Moreover, said the court, 9-103 (3) gave the creditor an "ab-
solute period of four months within which to trace the vehicle and
re-perfect, and a resale within the four months did not divest the credi-
tor's rights even though he failed to trace or re-perfect at all.
Then in 1966, the New Jersey Superior Court borrowed language
from the New York case and held, in 1st Nat'l Bank of Bay Shore v.
Stamper,3 7 that resales in New Jersey, within 4 months, under clean
certificates of title did not cut off the rights of a New York bank whose
security interest was properly filed under that state's conditional sales
law. The troublesome parts of Stamper are that the sub-purchasers were
apparently not automobile dealers but individual consumers, and the
bank did not discover the removal until 11 months after it had occurred
and 6 months after the original purchaser ceased making his monthly
payments. The holding thus ignored the legitimate expectations of
consumer buyers under local clean certificates and rewarded the credi-
tor despite his lack of diligence.
34. Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A. C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 569,229 N.Y.S. 2d 570, 579, 1 UCC REP. SERV. 371, 379 (1962). And see Editor's
Note, I UCC REP. SERV. 389.
35. 195 Pa. Super. 344, 171 A.2d 813 (1961).36. Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A. C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 299
N.Y.S. 2d 570 (1962).
37. 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162, 3 UCC REP. SERv. 949 (1966). The
critical holding was (3 UCC REP. SERV., at 960):
"The note by the draftsmen makes clear subsection 4 does not have
application to an automobile which was sold under a conditional sales
contract in a state which does not require 'indication on a certificate of
title of any security interest in the property as a condition of perfec-
tion,' and which was subsequently brought into a state which had such a
requirement."This sentence is taken verbatim from the Churchill Motors opinion (I UCC
REP. SERV., at 379-80).
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The original Mannheim rationale-that 9-103(4) by its terms ap-
plies when a local certificate is issued before resale but after removal-
has not been lost in the mist either. In Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St.
Paul F. & M. Ins. Co.,38 a car had been brought into Texas from Ok-
lahoma (which issued certificates but did not require notation of liens
thereon). A clean Texas certificate was issued and the car sold to
plaintiff dealer. The Oklahoma secured party repossessed the car off
plaintiff's lot, and he sued for conversion. A summary judgment for
the defendant creditor was affirmed because of technical defects in the
transfer and sale to the plaintiff, but in the course of the opinion the
Texas court made it clear that but for those defects it would have pro-
tected the local dealer. The court rejected the Stamper-Churchill
Motors view, preferring the Mannheim approach which gives prevailing
weight to the local clean certificate. The court also noted that the UCC
"has abrogated our decision" in Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz,39 the classic
pre-Code case protecting the foreign creditor, and that the Article 9
Review Committee -had rejected the Stamper approach in its Prelim-
inary Draft No. 2.
The Final Report deals explicitly with the Stamper situation in
9-103(2) (d). The Review Committee explains that it believes "more
protection should be given to the local 'clean' certificate of title than
was accorded in " Stamper,40 and the provision quite narrowly protects
only "a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling goods
of that kind . . . " and only if the certificate does not disclose the lien
or the foreign origin. While the intent is praiseworthy as consumer
protection policy, one can wonder whether the assumption is valid
that no local dealer merits the same protection. Part of the justification
of the new rule must be to enhance the reliability of the local certifi-
cate. If that certificate does not even indicate that the car has an out-
of-state origin, it is questionable whether the new provision properly
discriminates between dealers and others. If the car has also been re-
registered and carries local tags as well as a clean certificate there is
nothing to put even the most conscientious dealer on notice of an ac-
tual or possible foreign security interest. Probably the best justifica-
tion for the new rule is that it openly imposes the risk on dealers as a
cost of doing business.
There is, however, some measure of protection in the proposed new
Article 9 for dealers who acquire used cars relying on clean locaf cer-
tificates, and in this respect the new Code approves the result of the
Mannheim case and at least the theory of the Phil Phillips Ford opinion.
New 9-103 (2) (c) provides that in non-title to title state situations, the
controlling rule is that stated in 9-103(1) (d) for documents, instru-
ments and ordinary goods. That subsection then reverses the other
38. 465 S.W.2d 933, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1331 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1971).
39. 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950).
40. Comment G-15, FINAL REPORT, at 240.
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part of the Stamper-Churchill Motors holdings: that under old 9-103
(3) the foreign creditor had four months of absolute protection not
retroactively lost by failure to trace and re-perfect within that period.
Subsection (1) (d) (i) states that after the four-month period (or the
expiration of perfection in the other state) "the security interest be-
comes unperfected . . . and is thereafter deemed to have been unper-fected as against a person who became a purchaser after removal."
(Emphasis added.)
If, as is common, the skip-state buyer resells to a car dealer shortly
after removal of the car into the state, all local purchasers and sub-
purchasers will now be protected no matter when they purchase un-
less the out-of-state creditor is diligent in tracing the car and re-perfect-
ing within four months. The new Code rule should therefore be read
to impose a significant portion of the skip-state risk on the original
secured party who can either absorb it in his discount rate or through
insurance, or minimize it through efficient tracing.
One anomaly remains, and is perhaps accented by the new 9-103 (1)(d) (i). While the creditor is encouraged by the four-month rule to
follow his collateral, no pressure is put on him to re-perfect immediately
if he discovers the removal early in the four-month period. If he learns
of removal on, say, the 20th day, he can sit idly by until the 120th
day and still defeat all intervening claimants. A strange policy which
motivates businessmen to seek information but not to respond promptly
to it!
B. Perfection Via Out-of-State Certificate of Title
A literal reading of 9-103(4) says that where a vehicle is covered
by an appropriate certificate of title when removed to another state,
and that certificate notes the outstanding security interest, the interest
will continue perfected in the second state. But does perfection continue
indefinitely or is the four-month limitation impliedly carried over from
subsection (3)? When is a vehicle appropriately "covered" by a cer-
tificate? What happens when there are two certificates outstanding at
the same time, only one of which notes the security interest?
Duration of perfection. The cases have produced nearly uniform
holdings on the question of the duration of perfection based on the
out-of-state certificate. The stakes here can be quite high, for if the
secu'rity interest becomes unperfected four months after removal, any
subsequent creditor or purchaser without notice will defeat the secured
creditor. Expectably, most of the cases are bankruptcy proceedings
where the trustee as hypothetical lien creditor under section 70(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act challenges the creditor.
The bankrupt in In re White41 had purchased and titled his vehicle(a mobile home) in Virginia. The Virginia title act required notation
41. 266 F. Supp. 863, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 421 (N.D. N.Y. 1967).
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of liens on the certificate as a condition of validity and the creditor
bank's interest was so noted. The bankrupt then moved to New York
and seven months later filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The
District Court reversed the Referee's finding that 9-103(3) controlled
and the bank's perfection expired after four months, concluding instead
that while subsection (4) "lacks the clarity desirable" it completely
displaces subsection (3) in this situation. Unless so construed, said the
court, "subsection (4) would have little or no meaning." Thus, since
it was stipulated that the lien was properly perfected under the laws
of Virginia, it continued perfected beyond 4 months in New York.
Cases since White have relied on its opinion in resolving the same
issue.4 2 In one43 the same result was reached without reference to UCC
9-103 at all, but based instead on the provisions of the Georgia ver-
sion of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act. One referee
tried to distinguish the White holding on the ground that the vehicle
there had moved from a title state to a non-title state, while in his
case the vehicle had been taken to a second title state. The court re-
jected the distinction 44 as vitiating the clear meaning of 9-103 (4).
The Review Committee says that new section 9-103(2) (b) "af-
firms In re White and later cases in their interpretation of the relation-
ship between the certificate of title provision of existing subsection (4)
and the four months rule of existing subsection (3)." ' 45 In the process
they have also done more.
New 9-103(2) (b) provides that perfection is controlled by the for-
eign certificate "until four months after the goods are removed from
that jurisdiction and thereafter until the goods are registered in an-
other jurisdiction, but in any event not beyond surrender of the cer-
tificate." The section thus answers one question the White case left
unresolved: is the perfection based on the foreign certificate really
indefinite? The answer is no-the certificate ceases to be effective
either when it is surrendered or the vehicle is "registered" after four
months in the second state. Since registration usually involves the ap-
plication for and issuance of tags in the second state, and since virtu-
ally every state will require surrender of existing certificates and the
42. In re Friedman, Bank. No. 34520, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 890 (D. Conn.
1967); GMAC v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1016 (5th Cir.
1968); In re Caraway, Bank. No. 28858N, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1099 (W.D. Mich.
1968).; In re Worsley, Bank. No. 65-8436, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1180 (E.D. Mich.
1967); In re Fougere, Bank. No. 67-84-ND, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 410 (D. Me.
1968); Streule v. Gulf Finance Corp., 265 A.2d 298, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 734
(D.C. App. 1970); In re Canter, Bank. No. 9918, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 252 (E.D.
Tenn. 1970); In re Smith, 311 F. Supp. 900, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 948 (W.D. Va.
1970). af'd sub nor., Callaahan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 437 F.2d 898, 8
UCC REP. SERV. 901 (4th Cir. 1971).
43. Green v. King Edward Employees Fed. Cred. Union, 373 F.2d 613 (5th
Cir. 1967).
44. In re Smith, 311 F. Supp. 900, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 948 (W.D. Va. 1970),
reversing, Bank. No. 68-BK-62-C, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 860 (W.D. Va. 1969).
45. Comment G-11, FINAL REPORT, at 239.
1187July 1972
The Business Lawyer
issuance of new local ones, this is an appropriate point to require the
creditor to re-perfect. If the creditor has wisely retained the certificate,
it will know of the attempted reregistration. In the balance here, too,
is the legitimate interest of the receiving state in seeing that all vehicles
kept and driven regularly in the state are registered and that their
owners have paid the appropriate fees.
Having so wrought, the Review Committee perceived it had created
a new problem for itself-i.e., what to do if the vehicle is reregistered
shortly after removal without surrender of the outstanding certificate
on which the lien is noted? The Committee's comment says in that
event "the security interest . ..remains perfected for four months
after removal under Section 9-103(2) (c) ...for there is no reason
why rights on removal of collateral perfected on a certificate of title
should receive less favorable treatment than rights in collateral other-
wise perfected. '46 The intent may be clear, but the language in the
provision itself is intricate and strained. One can also challenge again
the policy decision which permits the secured creditor with notice of
removal and of reregistration to wait (safely, if he keeps the certifi-
cate) until the four months are about to run before he re-perfect.
The multiple-certificate situation. Because state motor vehicle de-
partments regularly require the surrender of outstanding certificates
before registering a vehicle, or before issuing a new local certificate,
the likelihood of there being more than one certificate at the same time
is slim. But it can happen. Clerks are human and may simply fail to
demand surrender of the certificate. And as Comment 4(b) to new
9-103 puts it, "various fraudulent devices based on allegations of loss
of the certificate of title enable a dishonest person to obtain both an
original and a duplicate of title; to have a security interest shown on
only one thereof; and then to effect a transfer into a new state on the
basis of the clean certificate, no matter how diligent the officers in the
second state may be." (Precisely this kind of fraud produced the bizarre
Ohio holding in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer4 7 in 1964).
By everyone's admission, the present version of 9-103(4) does not
say anything about multiple certificate situations. The reported Code
decisions thus far are all by bankruptcy referees.
In In re Schoeller48 a car covered by a Florida certificate which noted
the security interest was brought to Connecticut. An application was
submitted for a Connecticut certificate; the application disclosed the
Florida lien but failed to indicate the date of that lien as required under
the Connecticut title act. The Florida certificate was not surrendered
(the opinion does not indicate why: it was probably still held by the
reclaiming creditor), but a Connecticut certificate was issued in due
course and the debtor later went bankrupt. The Florida creditor would
46. Comment G-12, FINAL REPORT, at 240.
47. 176 Ohio St. 1, 197 N.E.2d 343 (1964).
48. Bank. No. 34529, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1093 (D. Conn. 1968).
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lose to the trustee if the Connecticut certificate controlled, because the
omitted date was fatal to the perfection of its interest on that certificate.
The referee noted that 9-103 (4)'s "singular wording contemplates the
existence of only one certificate of title at a time," and found
"that the legislature intended a Connecticut certificate of title
to eliminate and to supersede any previous certificate that may
have issued. And it follows that when a Connecticut certificate
is the presently existing one then, . . . it is 'the certificate' and
whether or not any previously granted security in a motor vehicle
remains perfected is governed by Connecticut law."'49
A similar fact pattern generated a similar ruling in a Michigan bank-
ruptcy in 1969. The referee held that 9-103 (4) "has application only
when a certificate of title of a foreign jurisdiction remains extant. When
a new certificate of title is issued by another state such state becomes
'the jurisdiction which issued the certificate.' "50
Later, another Michigan bankruptcy referee51 cited and followed
the rationale of Schoeller and Edwards, but had to deal with a new
element. A car was purchased, titled and encumbered in Georgia, and
the certificate noted the lien. When -the owner took the car into Michi-
gan, he promptly applied for a Michigan title and listed the Georgia
lien on the application. Bankruptcy occurred three days before the new
certificate was physically issued. The referee thus had to determine
which was the controlling certificate (if the Michigan one, creditor
would lose to the trustee for failure also to file a financing statement,
a unique requirement under the Michigan version of 9-302(4));52 he
reasoned that under 9-103 (4) perfection was controlled by Michigan
law only when a Michigan certificate was actually "issued". The date
of actual issuance is the key date (rather than the date of application
for the title) since that is the date effective notice is given through the
Michigan certificate-i.e., there will be no gap period when the lien
is governed by Michigan law but when an inquiry would not disclose
it. And since the Michigan certificate had not been issued on the date
of bankruptcy, the Georgia certificate still controlled and the creditor
was permitted to reclaim.
Although the comments to the revised 9-103 mention the multiple
certificate problem, the statutory language does not clearly solve it and
may confound it. The foreign. certificate will generally control until
surrendered, or until reregistration. Subsection (2) (b) provides that
49. 4 UCC REP. SERV., at 1097.
50. In re Edwards, Bank. No. 69-460-B, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 1124, 1126 (E.D.
Mich. 1969).
51. In re Wolf, Bank. No. NK-4-1-71B, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 177 (W.D. Mich.
1971).
52. MICH. STATS. ANN., §19.9302(4): "... the filing required . . . is not
only the filing with the secretary of state of an application for a certificate of
title . . . , but in addition the filing of a financing statement .... "
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"after the expiration of that period the goods are not covered by the
certificate of title within the meaning of this section." The implication
is that the goods are covered by the original certificate until then. If
by fraud or otherwise both a foreign and a local certificate of title are
issued and outstanding, this language would seem to give continuing
and controlling effect, indefinitely, to the first certificate. Such a result
would contradict Schoeller and Edwards, would undermine the relia-
bility of duly issued certificates, and would conflict in virtually every
certificate-of-title state with the requirement that outstanding certifi-
cates be surrendered upon issuance of new ones. In terms of risk-allo-
cation principles, the contest is not strictly between an innocent foreign
creditor and an innocent local claimant because interposed between
the wrongdoer and the local purchaser is the official functioning of the
motor vehicle department, on which the purchaser ought to be entitled
to rely.
There is nothing in the comments of the Review Committee to indi-
cate this unfortunate construction was intended, and the question is
how to avoid it? One way is to read the above-quoted language as not
being the exclusive statement of when the coverage of the original cer-
tificate ends; another determinant would be the issuance of a second
certificate. Support for this view may be found in the general phrasing
throughout new 9-103 (2) which apparently contemplates that only a
single certificate can cover the vehicle at any one time. In short, the
rationale of Referee Trevethan in Schoeller should not be discarded.
The "Lichtenstein" certificate. Professor Gilmore said it first:
"[I]f ... the principality of Lichtenstein issues a certificate of
title covering a truck owned by a debtor whose chief place of
business is in Massachusetts (a Code state) and if the truck has
never been operated in ... Lichtenstein, then the purported 'cer-
tificate of title' is merely waste paper and nothing in § 9-103 (4)
gives it any 'jural significance.' The certificate of title must then
be 'validly' issued, but nothing in the Code sheds any light on
'validity.' ,,
Neither does anything in the new version of 9-103 address the question
of which out-of-state certificates must be given effect.
A classic case came before Referee Nims in the western district of
Michigan in 1968. 54 Bankrupt had purchased a truck in Indiana for
use in his hauling business which he operated from his Michigan home.
To get the benefit of lower Indiana license and sales tax charges, he
had the vehicle registered and titled in Indiana, by using his sister's
address. The lien was noted on the certificate. The referee rejected the
creditor's claim based on the Indiana certificate, holding that in light
53. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 31, at 327.
54. In re Brown, Bank. No. 28106N, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 401 (W.D. Mich.
1968).
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of the purpose of Article 9 to give notice of security interests, Indiana
was an improper place to perfect a security interest in a vehicle kept
in Michigan.
A year later, however, the same referee found his earlier holding
inapposite where the bankrupt maintained a home in Michigan, but
lived during the week in a hotel in Chicago near the truck terminal at
which he worked. 5  He purchased a car, listed his Chicago address
and had the car titled in Illinois, disclosing a lien. Here Illinois was
considered a proper place to perfect, and the security interest noted
on the Illinois certificate was respected in the bankruptcy proceeding
in Michigan.
How often these fact patterns arise is uncertain. How often litigants
and courts recognize the Lichtenstein issue is also uncertain. 6 At the
same time, there is little substantive discussion of when the issuing
state's contacts with the transaction are so weak that its certificate
should be disregarded. The Michigan cases suggest the debtor's domi-
cile is critical, but in another bankruptcy matter in Tennessee 57 the
referee upheld a security interest noted on a Virginia certificate where
Virginia's only connection with the bankrupt was that the seller of the
vehicle (a mobile home) was located there.
To talk about "sufficient contacts" suggests that the issue is one of
the jurisdiction of the issuing state. Certainly a prime place to look to
see whether a given certificate properly covers a vehicle is to the cer-
tificate-of-title act of the issuing state. What does it say or suggest about
its own scope? Is it intended and can it have extra-territorial applica-
tion? Was the certificate properly issued in the first place? Has it ex-
pired? In these latter two instances, the certificate either was not
"issued", or no longer "covers" the vehicle in the sense of new 9-103
(2) (b).
But the question may also be one of choice of law. Being free to
enforce rights under the foreign certificate or not, should the forum state
do so where the issuing state has only tenuous connection to the transac-
tion and where there is substantial likelihood of misleading local pur-
chasers or creditors? Or does new 9-103 preempt any inquiry beyond
satisfaction of its terms?
Old 9-103 suggested at several points that the goods must at'least
have been located in the state of origin for the security interest to be
valid. New 9-103 (2) (b) in turn protects rights under a foreign cer-
tificate for a period, of time after "the goods are removed from that
55. In re Longnecker, Bank. No. 919N, 7 UCC REP. SERV. 264 (W.D. Mich.
1969).
56. A potential Lichtenstein problem in GMAC v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774,
4 UCC REP. SERV. 1016 (5th Cir. 1968), was ignored by the court but questioned
in V. COUNTRYMAN & A. KAUFMAN, COMMERCIAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
299-300 (1971).
57. In re Canter, Bank. No. 9918, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 252 (E.D. Tenn.
1970).
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jurisdiction", intimating that the goods must have been kept there on
some kind of permanent basis.
Doubtless there are considerations besides property location and
debtor's domicile that can enter into the determination whether a for-
eign certificate should be given effect. They are beyond the scope of
this paper. The point is that despite the apparently comprehensive lan-
guage of the new 9-103(2), some corollary principles concerning
the "Lichtenstein certificate" are emerging in the caselaw and will un-
doubtedly continue to do so.
The tardy certificate. A final problem has arisen in several cases
where servicemen returning from overseas, or about to change duty
stations in the United States, purchase automobiles and take them to
other states before the certificate of title is issued in the state of pur-
chase. For collateral generally, both the old and the new versions of
9-103 provide special rules for the situation where it is contemplated
that goods will be removed out of state within thirty days-in both
versions the law of the second state controls. But because both old and
new 9-103 treat certificates of title separately these rules do not affect
title-certificate situations, and the question then arises whether a foreign
certificate issued after removal should be given effect.
In two bankruptcy cases in Maine,58 Referee Cyr read subsection
(4) of old 9-103 to require that the certificate be actually issued at
the time the vehicle was brought into the forum state. Since issuance
followed removal, the security interest was not perfected on entry and
should have been filed in Maine. This analysis seems unexceptionable
if one implies into subsection (4) the time-of-entry reference, but that
reference is not explicit in either the old or the new statutory provision.
As the Stamper case shows,5 9 old 9-103 (4) necessarily refers to some
point in time, but -the new 9-103 (2) (a) states simply that it "applies
to goods covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this
state or of another jurisdiction. . . ." In the Maine cases the vehicles
were certainly covered by an issued certificate on -the date of bank-
ruptcy, and assuming the issuing state was a proper state to certificate
the vehicle there seems no strong reason to deny effect to liens noted
on -that certificate because of the fortuitous chronology which saw the
debtor move before -the motor vehicle department did.
Especially is this true where "perfection" in the issuing state dates
from the filing of the application for the certificate, or where issuance
of the certificate retroactively perfects the interest in the issuing state.
Referee Cyr noted the possible impact of the latter kind of rule in one
of his opinions,60 but did not consider the 10-day retroactive-perfection
58. In re Erwin, Bank. No. 70-218 ND, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1399 (D. Me.1971 ); In re Zimmardi, Bank. No. 70-187 ND, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1396 (D. Me.
1971).
59. See, text, supra, at nn. 33-37.
60. In re Erwin, Bank. No. 70-218 ND, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1399 (D. Me.
1971).
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provision of the Arkansas title act to be controlling so long as no cer-
tificate had actually issued by the time the car was taken out of Arkan-
sas.
On the other hand, as noted earlier, if the lien is considered per-
fected before actual physical notation on a certificate, arguably that
certificate is not one to which 9-103 (4) even applies: that section re-
quires "indication of a security interest on the certificate as a condition
of perfection." (Emphasis added.) By this view the Maine cases are
correct, and no foreign creditor gets the benefit of 9-103(4) unless
his interest is marked on the certificate and the certificate has been
fully processed through the motor vehicle department before removal
of the vehicle.
The resolution of this matter of when the certificate must be issued
is probably not of great moment,61 but it points up anew the virtual
impossibility of tying up in succinct and uniform statutory language
all the possible loose ends of transactional patterns as complex as
certificate-of-title cases can be.
Conclusion
Problems existed with 9-103(4) from the moment it was drafted.
The critical ones are addressed in the proposed new version of 9-103
(2) but with only partially salutary results. The innocent consumer
buyer gets some additional protection, as do other local purchasers
where there is no re-perfection within four months. The multiple-
certificate situation is not clearly resolved, and the subliminal "Lich-
tenstein" problem is not even confronted.
At its best the revision is a band-aid on a crippled limb. If clear and
uniform rules are the goal, the bedrock problem with respect to se-
curity interests in certificated vehicles is not the UCC's choice of law
rule but the gross non-uniformity among certificate acts and systems.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws find themselves sponsoring
two uniform acts-the UCC and the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certifi-
cate of Title Act-which contain incompatible provisions. 62 Systems
for the perfection of vehicle security interests are as diverse as, for
example, ,Maine and Michigan. The former requires either municipal
61. In one case where goods were removed to Tennessee almost two months
before the Virginia certificate was issued, the court either did not see the prob-
lem at all or preferred to ignore it. The Virginia creditor was protected through
the "tardy" certificate. In re Canter, Bank. No. 9918, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 252
(E.D. Tenn. 1970).
62. At several points the Review Committee acknowledges these incompati-
bilities and urges conforming changes in certificate of title laws. FINAL REPORT,
at 238, 240. Georgia enacted both the UCC and the Uniform Certificate of Title
Act without reconciling the two, and the resulting uncertainty about which ap-
plies in a given situation is revealed in GMAC v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774,
4 UCC REP. SERV. 1016 (5th Cir. 1968). Connecticut, on the other hand, mod-
ified its version of the Uniform Certificate of Title Act to avoid conflicts with
the UCC. See, In re Scannell, Bank. No. H 6107, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 884 (D.
Conn. 1966).
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or central state filing of a financing statement, while in the latter both
county filing of a financing statement and notation on a certificate of
title are necessary.
No amount of tinkering with choice of law rules can produce the de-
sired certainty in the law without considerable standardization of cer-
tificate of title legislation. The decision in the UCC to defer to such
statutes seems well-nigh irrevocable, and the question becomes what
possibilities are there realistically for achieving statutory uniformity.
One possibility would be a takeover of motor vehicle registrations by
the federal government. This suggestion is undoubtedly anathema to
state officials on countless grounds amounting in sum to an improper
preemption of state functions by the federal government. Huge dis-
placements of personnel and expertise would be needed to create the
new bureaucracy, and perhaps most significantly vehicle registration
and certification revenues would become federal revenues. Historically,
one of the foremost reasons why -the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws set about drafting the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title
and Anti-Theft Act in the 1950's was "to prevent the invasion by the
Federal Government of the field of certificates of title threatened by
proposed federal legislation. 063
The alternative, then, is renewed efforts toward the adoption of uni-
form legislation by the proponents of state-control of certificates of title.
A first step ought to be a reconsideration by the NCCUSL of its uni-
-form title act to harmonize it with the UCC in all respects. The follow-
up would be the kind of concerted promotion and lobbying effort as
was used for the UCC, with the support, hopefully, of the motor ve-
hicle commissioners, the ABA and any other interested groups. In the
meantime-and despite the Review Committee's improvement of 9-103
-the problems will almost certainly not diminish.
63. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of
Title and Anti-Theft Act, 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 369 (1966). The ref-
erence is to a series of bills and resolutions introduced in Congress in the early
1950's calling for the establishment of a Federal Motor Vehicle Commission
and a national automobile registration system. One such bill, H.R. 154, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), called for the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts to establish procedures for the registration of automobiles by the clerks
of the federal district courts. It died in committee.
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